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There exists a large literature that describes and attempts to explain observed capital
structure choices in  developed economies (see the survey by Harris  and Raviv (1990).  This
literature normally takes as given, first, the existence of well fimctioning  liquid financial markets
in which investors can diversify risks and second, the existence of an efficient legal system in
which a broad range of property rights can be enforced. While appropriate for the analysis of
financing choices in the U.S.,  these assumptions are often not satisfied in other economies. In
many economies financial markets are at early stages of development: only a small proportion
of the risks is traded, the markets are relatively illiquid and heavily regulated. Little is known
about the effect of such conditions on the opfimal financing choices of firms.
In this paper we provide evidence on the capital structure choices of firms for a panel
of ten developing countries using annual data for 1980-1991. We describe observed financial
structure choices and compare them to U.S. financial structure choices. We ask whether models
of  developed for United States institutions explain capital stucture  choices in our panel of
developing countries.
While r.ar findings bear most directly on developing economies, they are of more general
interest. Models oFfinancial structure have been developed with the aim of explaining U.S. data.
They are  based on U.S.  institutions. Predictions often depend on  specific assumptions about
institutional structure of these models. Testing the models with data from economies with less
developed financial markets and very different institutions provides a  test of robustness of these
models. In this sense our paper can be viewed as a complement to the work of Bradley, Jarrell
3and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) for the U.S.,  and Ragan and Zingales (1994)
for a sample of several developed countries.
The the paper  is organized as  follows. Section II  discusses the principal differences
between the U.S. and the developing economies that we are analyzing. Section HII  discusses the
theoretical framework. Section IV presents the empirical results and Section V concludes.
IOL  Insttutions  in  Developing Countries
We investigate capital structure  in Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Jordan,
Zimbabwe,  India,  Thailand and Pakistan.  We  identify four broad reasons why developing
country capital structures may be different: differences in the level of economic and financial
development, institutional  dlifferences,  smaller firm size, and different tax treatment of debt and
equity.
A.  Economic and Financial Develovment:
As shown in Table 1, the per capita GDP in these countries is much lower tha  in the
U.S. It ranges from about 22.5% of the U.S. level in the case of Korea to justl1.9%  in the case
of Pakdstan.  These economies and their financial systems.  differ in other significant respects from
that in the U.S.  In this section we review some of these differences and  discuss how they may
affect the firmn's  capital structure decision.
One measure of  market development is the ratio  of market capitalization to  Gross
Domestic Product, MCAP/GDP. As revealed in column (3) of Table 1, MCAP/GDP ranges
from 16.  1% in the case of Turkey to 70% in the case of Malaysia, with a median of  23  %. The
corresponding statistic for the U.S.  is 74.5%. However, MCAP/GDP of most of the countries
4in our sample is greater those in some developed countries, such as Germany  and Italy (Pagano
(1993)). Thus, stock markets in most of the countries in the sample are consequential in their
economies.
Financial intenmediaries are  another source of financing for corporatioDns.  While it is
difficult to measure the development of finncial  internediaries,  it is likely that the availability
of financing  is positively related to the size of financial intermnediary  sector. Hence, the size of
the formal financial intermediary sector relative to economic activity has frequently been used
as a  measure the finanial  sector development. 1 Column (2) of Table 1 lists the ratio of M3,
the liquid liabilities of the financial system, to GDP.' The Table reveals a wide variation iti our
sample.  It reflects Jordan's  role as a regional financial center and the relative sophistication of
Malaysia's  financial  sector.
Corporations' ability to rais  external financing may be related to the stability ofT  the price
level. Mean inflation f:ates  over the sample period are listed in column (5). Our sample contain
countries with  very high rates of inflation (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) and very low  rates
(Jordan and Malaysia). As expected, the inflation rate is negatively correlated with the ratio of
M3 to GDp. 3
B.  Institutional Differences:
There are some significant institational differences between the financial system in our
sample of countries and those in the Uwited  States.  In capital markets, certai  pricing decisions
'-  See,  for example. Goldsmith  (1969)  and McKinnon  (1973).
2  Liquid liabilities  arc  mecasured  by M3.  which  is defined  as  the currency  held  outside  the  banking  system
plus  demand  and  interest  bearing  liabilities  of banks  and  nonbank  fmiancial  intermediaries.
3  The Spearman  rank  coefficient  is -0f97.
5are much frequently  more heavily regulated, whereas there are often fewer protections for
investors.  Table 2 summarizes  some key institutional  features  of the markets  in our sample.
A key deviation from U.S. practice is that with the exception  of Brazil, Mexico and
Jordan, in all the countries  in our sample  there exist  restrictions  on the pricing  or issue of bonds
or stocks. In some cases these restrictions are significant,  particularly for new issues. For
example,  during our sample  period in Pakistan  companies  could not offer shares  at above  book
value (Mirza (1993, page 208)). Similar  restrictions  existed  in India (Glen and Pinto (1994)).
In Malaysia, "looming  over the entire industry  is the feared  Central Issues Committee" which,
among other powers, has the right to determine the prices of initial public offerings and which
may take up to six months  to rule on a price (Seaward  (1993),  page 153)."
As revealed in Table 2, fimancial  markets  in our sample  countries  differ in the amount
of protection offered to investors. According  to data compiled by the Intematonal Finance
Corporation,  accounting  standards  are adequate  or of internationally  acceptable  quality  for all
countries  except  Jordan.'  By the end of 1992 all the countries  in the sample had a securities
commission  or a similar-  government  agency.  India, Korea,  Malaysia  Mexico  and Zimbabwe  also
have bond rating agencies.
Differences from U.S. practice  are not confined  to the regulation  of capital markets.
Governments  of the countries  in our sample  are in general  more active  in business  affairs. Most
importntly, in some  countries  financial  intermediaries  are required  to provide  directed  long-tenn
4Se  Seward  for an argumet  tha thCapital  Issucs Commitess  pices  of initial public offerings artificially low (page 152). Ritter
(1993) provides evidence that average underpricing  of initial public  offerings in Malaysia is 149%.
5  in some cases some requirements appear to  be stricter han in the U.S In Malaysia the Central Issues
Committee  holds directors  of newly floated companies  rcsponsible  for deviations  of morc than 10% frem forecasts in
prelisting prospectuses  (Seaward (1993)).
6credit to selected firms (see, for example Baer et al (1994) and their references).
C.  Differences in Firm Size:
A further difference between the U.S. market and the countries studied here is in the size
of firms. As shown in Table 3, publicly traded firms in the U.S. are much larger than publicly
traded firms in our sample countries. Only in Korea does the average size of firms in the highest
quartile exceed the average size of firms in the lowest quartile in the U.S.  At the other extreme,
in Zimbabwe, the average firm in the largest quartile is six times smaller than the average firm
in the lowest U.S.  quartile. However, although these firms are small by U.S.  standards, they
are large relative to their local economies. Hence, they may receive attention  from local financial
communuities  that U.S.  firms of comparable size would not.
D.  Tax Treatment of Debt vs. Eguity:
Table 4 summarizes the tax treatment of interest income, dividends and capital gains. In
most  countries  the  personal  income tax  rates  vary  with  income.  To  provide  a  consistent
comparison of tax levels across countries we have assumed that the marginal investor is a private
individual who is sufficiently wealthy to be paying personal income taxes at the highest rates.6
Using this benchmark, interest payments are clearly the most tax advantaged form of payment
in only two countries: India and Korea. In Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan and Thailand the
net tax burden is generally lower on equity income.
m.  Detemiinants  of Capital  Structure
6  Rajan and Zingales (1993) make the same assumption  in their comparison  of tax burdens in a sample of
developed  economies. Similarly, when there exists multiple  corporate tax rates we have assumed that firms face the
highest  raze. Thresholds  for the maximum  rate are typically  set very low.
7In this section we fintroduce  a framework  for discussing  the firmn's  choice of financial
structure  in developing  economies.  We review the existing  literature  on financial  structure and
discuss its applicability  to developing  economies.  The corporate  finance literature  has focused
on two broad determinants  of capital  structuire:  agency  theoretic  explanations  that stress conflicts
of interest  between  various  stakeholders  in the firm and explanations  that stress  tax consequences
of capital structure  choices. We review each in turn and describe  the variables  that we use to
measure  the predicted  effects.
A.  Agencv  Teoretic  Exuplanations  of Capital  Structure:
Severl  distinct conflicts of  interest that arise between the investors holding different
classes of securities have been identified in the literature. These conflicts arise because holders
of one class of investors (typically equityholders) act as agents for other investors and take
decisions that affect the value of the firm as a whole.'  As a result,  these investors have an
incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior that increases their payoffs at the expense of  other
classes of investors and the firm as a whole.
The reduction in the firms  value that results from opportuistic  behavior by those in
-ontrol of a corporation is termed the agency cost of fiancing.  If they are rational, the holders
of securities whose value is reduced by opportunistic behavior factor their expected losses into
the price that they are willing to pay for their securities.  Hence, it is in the finns'  residual
owners' interest to choose capital structe  that minimizes agency costs, and thereby maximizes
the price at which each fiam's securiies  can be sold. As a result of these choices, if agency
theoretic explanations are valid, the observed capital structure of each firm should depend on
'7  For example.  die equiiyholders  may make decisions chat alter the risldness of the firm's  operations.
8the potential for opportunistic  behavior  in that firm.
The potential for opportunistic  behavior depends on the extent to which the agents'
actions  affect value and the extent to which contracts  that regulate actions  can be written and
enforced. Thus, agency  costs will depend  on the firm's technology,  development  of financial
institutions and markets, the investors' incentives  to monitor and the legal system in each
country, among other factors. The firm's optimal  capital  stnxcture  will in general also depend
on these factors.
The corporate fmance literature  has identified  several conflicts of interest that arise in
many situations  and analyzed  fmancial  structures  that minimize  them. The two most important
conflicts are  between the firm's  insiders and outside investors and the conflicts between
equityholders  and debtholders.
The firms insiders frequently  have opportnities to consume perquisites in ways that
cannot be easily monitored  by outside investors. This creates a conflict of interest between
insiders  and outside  investors.  This conflict  can be mitigated  in following  ways:
*  By issuing debt securities instead of  equity the insiders can contractually commit
themselves to a prespecified level of  payment to outside investors, thus reducing
opportunities  for opporaunistic  behavior.
*  By issuing debt securities with shorter matuities the insiders commit themselves to
renegotiating  the firm's financing  at short intervals.  This reduces  their insiders  to exploit
their creditors.
A second important  conflict  of interest is that between  the firm's equity holders and the
9firm's debt holders.'  As leverage increases, the equityholders have an incentive to siphon funds
out of the firm through dividends and stock repurchases. This is because all the siphoned funds
go to the equityholders whereas the consequent reduction in the finn  value is shared with the
debtholders.  In addition, because the value of equity is a convex function of the. value of the
firm, as leverage increases equityholders have an incentive to select risky policies even if they
lead to decreases in firm value.  The conflict between equityholders and debt holders can be
reduced by:
*  Reducing debt levels in industries where the potential for opportunistic behavior is high.
*  Securing long term investments with specific capital assets.
*  Shortening the maturity of debt.
As the maturity of debt is a critical variable in agency models, we analyze the firm's
choice  of  long-term  and  short-term  debt  levels  separately.  Our  measure  of  long  term
indebtedness is the ratio of  the book values of long term debt to total equity, LTDTE, and our
measure of short-term indebtedness, STDTE, is the rtio  of the book value of short-term debt
to the book value of debt. The determinants of financial structure are:9
Asset Structure:  The composition of the firm's assets affects its abilitry  to commit not to
engage in opportunistic behavior. Fixed assets usually have collateral value. A finm with fixed
assets can issue secured debt, thereby limiting its ability to expropriate the debt-holders. Thus,
we expect firms with greater amounts of fixed assets to issue more long-term debt than finns
with fewer fixed assets.  We use the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets,  NFATA as our
e  For a  detailed analysis see Hart (1993).
9  We give below the interpretations of variables that we find most plausible. Additional interpretations of some
variables  are possible,  as  in for example Tiunan  and Wessels (1988).
10.'  lmeasure  of the firm's  asset structure. We expect that this ratio is positively related to LTDTE
and negatively related to STDTE.
In the absence of collateral, a greater degree of monitoring by creditors may be optimal.
Monitoring by  creditors is facilitated by  issuing debt with shorter  maturity. Thus, we would
expect  firms which do  not borrow to finance fixed assets to  have more short  tenn  debt.  A
measure of the firn's  financing needs, other than the need to finance fixed assets, is the Ratio
of Net Sales to Net Fixed Assets, NSNFA. Firms with a high ratio of sales to net fixed assets
have cost structures requiring more monitoring, and are therefore expected to have more short-
term debt and less long-term debt.
Leverage and Liquidity Constraints:  Recent literature, following  Myers-Majluf (1984) has
suggested that internal generated capital is cheaper for the firm than external financing. This
suggests that firms would finance internally first, and issue debt only when such low cost sources
of  fmancing have  been  exhausted. We  measure the  finn's  initial excess  internal funds  by
DIVCSH,  the  ratio  of  dividends  paid  out  to  shareholders  to  its  cash  flow  available  for
reinvestment:  earnings  after  taxes plus depreciation. The higher this  variable the  less  cash
constrained the firm  is.  Thus, we would expect both LTDTE and STDTE to be negatively
related to DIVCSH.10
An alternative variable that has been used to measure the firm's ability to generate capital
internally, by Titman and Wessels (1988) among others,  is earnings before interest and taxes
over total assets, PROFIT.  In studies of the U.S.  economy this variable has repeatedly been
10  For some countries  data on depreciation  and eamnings  after tax is not available.  For hose countries we use
the ratio of dividends to total assets. DIVTA, to proxy for cash constraints.
11found to  be negatively correlated with leverage and we expect  it to be similarly related to
financing choices in our sample.
Growh:  As suggested by Myers (1977), equityholders in highly leveraged  firms with
significant  growth opportunities  have incentives to adopt suboptimal investment policies.  If  this
agency cost is significant,  we expect fast gro-wing firms to be financed  with equity or with short-
tern  debt. Our measure of growth is the rate of growth of real  total assets, GROWTH. We
expect this variable to be negatively related to LTDTE and to be unrelated or positively related
to STDTE.
Firm  Size: Thme is considerable evidence that firm financing patterns in developed
countries differ for firms  according to size. Barclay and Smith (1993) have shown that size is
an important predictor of debt maturity in the U.S. and Baias and Hillion (1991)  have shown that
the amount of short term credit is predicted by firm size. This effect may arise because access
to financial markets may be a function of firm size. Additionally, the amount of monitoring by
investors may depend on the liquidity of the market for the firm's equity, which, in tum,  is
related to firm size-" We allow for these effects by segmenting our sample into quartiles by
size of total assets and icluding  size dummies in our equations, SZ1-SZ4, where SZl  denotes
the smallest quartile.  An alternative size vaiable we also use is  firm total assets to  GDP,
TAGDP.
Firm Age: There are arguments supporting  the prediction that younger firms will be less
indebted (Titman and Wessels (1988)). Younger firms have shorter credit histories which makes
it more difficult to judge their quality.  Younger firms also tend to be riskier since they exit
As shown  by Riuer (1987), there exist economies  of scale in the issuance  of equity.
12more frequently.  To test for thie  age effect we cnst-~c  twaaibe:teaeo  h  im
AGE, and a dummny  variable, YOUNG, which t-ake the value one if AGE is less tha  or equal
to five, and zero otherwise.
Indu~stry  Classification: The pkoduct  market structur  and type of competitive interaction
across fi-rms differs from industry to industry. To the extent that capital structur  affect the
incentives  of firms to enter into imnplicit  contracts with rivals (Maksimovic  (1988)) or to maintain
reputations (Maksimovic and Titman (1990)), capital structures will differ systematically  across
industries. To control for these industry effects, we include when available dummies for inLdustry
classification (at  the 2 digit SIC code level)." 2 These industry dummies may also pick up
differences in asset structure across industries that are not captured by NFATA and NSNFA.
Market 's Valuation of Equity: Our measures of the firm's capital structur,  the ratios of
the book values of long-term and short-term debt to total equity,  implicitly assume that book
values adequately measure the economic values used in determining the firm's capital structure.
However, book values do not directly measure the market's valuation of the firm's  growth
opportunities. If the finn  can borrow against the value of growth opportunities, firim's with
higher markcet  valuations will have higher book value of  debt to equity ratios  (LTDTE and
STDTE). 13 To contol  for this we include the difference between the market's valuation of the
firm's  equity and its book value, scaled by the book value,  (MV-BV)IBV, as an explanatory
variable. We expect this variable to be positively related to LTDTE and STDTE.
B.  Taxation and the Capital Structure:
Firms were classified  into 2-digit SIC codes  on the basis of descriptions  of the firm's principal industry.
13  itis  unalky  thatdefirmn  borrowagai  its growth opporne  in thesame way thatit  an borrow
against  fixed asse.  For a discussion  of these issues  see Myers (197  and Hat  and Moore (1991).
13The second imnportant  determinant of capital structure is the tax system. The fin-n's
financing choice affects.  its tax liabilities  because the total amount of taxes paid by the firm's
investors, at both the corporate and personal levels, differs accordinig  to whether they bold equity
or debt securities. This differential  treatment of investment  income induces investors' preferences
for holding equity or debot  securities. Firms attempt to satisfy these preferences by optimailly
altering their capital structur.  Depending on the level of personal and corporate taxes,  this
optimizing behavior by finns results in one of two outcomes.
First, if tax rates are such that one formn  of financing (debt or equity) is unambiguously
tax advantaged, then there may exist an optimal debt-equity ratio for each firmn  that minimizes
its total taxes and that depends on the firm's tax liabilities." Second, for some tax regimes the
aggregate supply of debt and equity securities in the economy may adjust so that  individual
firms are indhfferent  between issuing debt or equtity  (Miller (1977h).  In both cases individual
firms may have an incentive to chose low debt levels if they cannot utilize debt tax shields
(DeAngelo and Mastilis (1980)).
We examine the relationship between an individual firm's debt level and two measures
of non-debt tax shields, depreciation expanse over total assets, DEPTA, and estimated non-debt
tax shields over total assets, NDTS. Following Titman and Wessels (1988), we estimate the
latter as
NDTS =  EBT - (EBT-EAT)/Tc
where EBT is income before taxes, EAT is income after taxes and Tc  is the corporate tax rate.
14  This follows  from the analysis  of (Modigliani-Miller  (1958)).
14IV.  Empirical  Results
A.  Discussion of the Data:
The data for this study were collected by the International Finance Corporation. The
description of the data set and the definition of each variable are given in the Appendix."  The
means of the variables used in the study are shown in Table 5.
Inspection of Table 5 reveals that in every case for which we have data, the mean short-
term debt exceeds the mean long-tf.rm debt. India, Korea and Pakistan have the highest mean
levels of total debt and Brazil, Mexico and Zimbabwe have the lowest levels. These contrasts
are also shown by time series of aggregate levels of short-term, long-term and total debt by
country in Figure 1.
B.  Regression Results:
In this subsection  we examine the finnial  capital structures of the firms in our sample.
We follow the literature,  in regressing  measures of capital structure STDTE and LTDTE on the
detenninants discussed above. 16 In interpreting the results of the regressions it is necessary to
keep in mind that short-term debt and long-term debt are both components of total indebtedness.
In  some  cases  theory  predicts different  determinants of  long-term and  short-term  debt
25  We have deleted some observations from the data set when they seemed to contain obvious errors  or  to
pertain to situations  not within the scope of this research. Thus,  for example.  observations which did not report fill
fiscal year results were  deleted. Likewise, observations which reported  implausibly highly negative growth rates were
also eliniinated- Details arc available from the authors.
16  This is also consistent with the theoretical models on which the above list of capital  structure  determinants
is based.  These models  derive capital structure as a  function  oF given determinants.  This suggests staistical  tests in
which the  determinants are taken as exogenous.  A  more general  approach would be  to derive a strucural  model of
financing in developing economies. Our approach may be viewed as an initial step towards that approach.
15indebtedness: asset structure, for example, is predicted to affect each differently. In other cases,
only the total level of debt may matter: for example in shielding income from taxes. In the latter
case, the sign of any single component of debt may differ from that predicted by theory for the
total level of debt.'7
Consider  first  asset  structure  as a determinant  of capital  structure.  Agency  theory  suggests
that  firms with large fixed assets  have a comparative  advantage  in obtaining  long-term  debt,
whereas  finns with high sales relative  to fix assets  have  a comparative  advantage  in borrowing
over shorter  periods.  This suggests  that NFATA  is positively  related  to long-term  indebtedness
LTDTE and that NSNFA is  positively related to short-term indebtedness,  STDTE. By
implication,  we expect  that firms NFATA  is negatively  related to STDTE  and that NSNFA  is
negatively  related to LTDTE.
Panels  (a) and (b)  of Table  6 reveals  that of the eight countries  for which  we have data
on these variables  (we do not have data on net fixed assets for Zimbabwe)  the relationship
between  NFATA  and LTDTE  is positive  and significant  at the 5% level or better in five of the
eight cases. The relationship  between  NFATA  and STDTE  is even  more striking. In seven of
the eight countries  the relationship  is negative  and significant-  The only exception  is Mexico,
where it is positive  but not significant.
The signs of the coefficients  of NSNFA  also  support  the predictions,  although  they are
less clear cut. NSNFA  is significant  at the 5  % level  or better  and positively  related to STDTE
in four cases. It is negatively  related  in only two cases, and they are not statistically  significant.
"  We have rerun the regressions  reported  below, normalizing  debt with total assets instead  of total equity.
The general conclusions  are unaffected.
16Taken  together,  these  results  offer strong  support  for the prediction  that finms  with large
amounts  of fixed assets have a comparative  advantage  in borrowing  over the long-term.  They
offer more  qualified  support  for the proposition  that firms  with high ratios  of sales over net fixed
assets have a comparative  advantage  in short tenn borrowing.
The finding  that finns with large net fixed assets  have  a comparative  advantage  in long-
term borrowing  does not imply that such firms have a comparative  advantage  in long-term
borrowing  over equity  financing.  Panel 6(c) shows  the results  of the regression  of total debt on
total equity, TDTE. NFATA in the TDTE equation is significant and negative in four cases and
significant  and positive  in one case, that of Mexico. NSNFA  is significant  and negative  in two
cases. It is also  significant  and positive  in two other  cases. These  results  imply  that, if anything,
firms  with  more fixed  assets  have  less total  debt than  fims with fewer  fixed  assets. This finding
is  counterintLutive  in a  partial equilibrium framework that abstracts from  the  state of
development  of the market  for credit-  However,  it may be explained  as discussed  by Shleifer  and
Vishny  (1992)  and Worthington  (1994),  if asset specificity  reduces  the coliateral  value  of fixed
assets, or if the market for long-term  debt financing  in the sample  countries  is less developed
than the market  for equity  fmancing.' 8
Next, consider  the effect of the firms  cash flow on its capital  stmcture. Our preferred
measure  of excess  funds,  DIVCSH  is available  for five  of the nine countries.  Of these five cases
it is significantly  related to STDTE  in three instances.  The relationship  is negative  in all these
cases. DIVCSH  is significandy  related  to LTDTE  in three instances,  all of them  negatively  so.
For four countries  we do not have information  to calculate  DIVCSH.  In three of these
3-  This would  be the case, for example,  if properLy  rights of  long-term  debt-holders  are cosdy to enforce.
17cases (Brazil, Jordan and Turkey) we proxy for excess cash flow by using the ratio of dividends
to  total  assets,  DIVTA.19  Four  of  the  six coafficients have the  predicted negative sign.
However, only one, in the STDTE for Turkey is it statistically significant.
Inspection of Table 6 reveals an even stronger negative relationship  between profitability
and leverage. PROFIT is negatively related to STDTE for all nine countries (eight of them
significantly) and also negatively related to LTDTE in eight of the nine countries (five of them
significantly).2Y  The exception is Pakistan, where PROFIT is positively, but insignificantly
related to  LTDTE.  However,  even  in the  case of  Pakistan there  is a  significant negative
relationship between PROFIT and STDTE.
The signs of the liquidity and profit variables, DIVCSH, DIVTA and PROFIT, in the
TDTE  equations are  also consistent with  a  negative relationship between profitability and
leverage. The signs are significant three, two and eight times respectively and are uniformly
negative when significant.
Taken together, these results point to a strong negative relationship between internally
generated resources and indebtedness  - profitable firms and firms that make large payments to
equityholders borrow less.  In conjunction  with the fmding above that finrs  with high net fixed
assets do not take advantage of their asset structre  to borrow more in total, perhaps as a result
of monitoring issues identified above, this suggests that a lack of liquidity, may be an important
determinant of debt financing in the sample countries.
21  This variable measures  the ratio of cash paid out to equityholders to total assets. Thus, it is a less accurate
measurc of the firm's voluntary payouts to cquityholders than DIVCSH, which measures  the proportion of available cash-
flow paid out.
20  For Jordan and Mexico  profit is defined  as EBT instead  of EDIT.  Therefore,  the nregative  relationship  is
built in.
18-A'  :
The relationship between the rate of growth and leverage is weak but consistent with
predictions of agency theory, in particular Myers (1977). The theory predicts that fast growing
firms will issue short term debt in preference to long term debt in order to align the incentives
of equityholders and bondholders. For six of the nine countries in our sample the coefficient of
GROWTH in the equation explaining STDTE is positive. It is only statistically significant in two
of these cases. The coefficient is not statistically  significant in either of the three cases in which
it is negativc. In the equation explaining LTDTE the pattern is even weaker. Only one of the
four positive coefficients is significant. One of the five negative coefficients is also significant.
The results  for the  TDTE equation are  equally inconclusive: the  coefficient of  the growth
variable is more mixed: it is positive and significant in two of the four cases and negative and
significant in one.
The excess  of  market valuation to  book valuation (MV-BV)IBV is predicted to  be
positively related to STDTE and LTDTE.2' We  have market value data for five countries.
Inspection of Table 6 shows that for all five the coefficient of (MV-BV)/BV is positive in the
STDTE equation. It is statistically significant in three of the five cases. For four out of the five
cases the coefficient of (MV-BV)/BV  is positive in the LTDTE equation. However, it is only
signifcant in two of these cases. The results for the TDTE equation are similar:  the coefficient
of (MV-BV)/BV is positive in each case, but is only significant in two of these cases.
Tax effects are measured by two variables. The most direct measure is the estimate of
the firm's  non-debt tax shields, NDTS. Theory predicts that debt and non-debt tax shields are
21  More  preisely,  this variable is predicted  to be positively  related  to dte debt level, not necessarily  to each
of the components  of indebtedness.
19substitutes. The coefficient of NDTS in the STDTE equation is significant in four instances. It
is negative  in each case. In the LTDTE  equation  the coefficient  is negative  in five of the eight
cases, but is significant  in only two. Similarly,  the coefficient  of NDTS  is negative  in seven out
of the eight cases in the TDTE equation.  However,  it is significant  in only three cases, and for
Mexico the coefficient  is positive.
The other measure  of non-debt  tax shields  is DEPTA,  depreciation  over total assets. Data
are available  for five countries.  Inspection  of Table 6 rcveals  that the coefficient  of DEPTA in
the STDTE  equation  is significant  (and negative)  in three of the five cases. It is significant  and
positive  for only Malaysia.  The relationship  between  LTDTE  and DEPTA is significant  only in
the case of Kprea, where it is negative.
Turning  to the size dummies,  the coefficient  of SZ4 in the LTDTE  equation is positive
and  significapt  in  five of  the  nine  cases (it  is  insignificant in  the  other  four  cases).  The
coefficients  for SZ2 are predominantly  negative  and all three of the significant  coefficients  are
negative. This suggests  that largest  firms find it easier to obtain long term financing  compared
to smaller  firms which find it more difficult.  There is no similar  pattern  in the STDTE  equation.
When  we substitute  size  dummies  with.  total asset size to GDP, TAGDP,  in the LTDTE  equation
the coefficients  are positive  for seven  out of nine countries  and significant  in four  of them.  The
results of the STDTE are mixed.
Finally, our age variables  do not have  significant  coefficients  in any of our regressions.
One reason for this is that the firms in our sample  tend to be mostly older, over ten years of
age.
In our equations  we have  included  industry  dummies.  This specification  is consistent  with
20methodology  used in previous cross-sectional  studies of capital structure such as Bradley, Jarrell
and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) for the U.S. The inclusion of industry dummies
is also motivated by the considerable theoretical literature that predicts industry effects.22  In
order to investigate the effect of including industry effects we have reestimated the equations
reported in Table 6 without the industry dummies and with individual firm dummies replacing
the industry dummies.
T.he  two alternative specifications  have differing implications  for the interpretation of the
regression equations. The specification without the industry dummies risks attributing to the
variables included in our study differences in capital structure across industries that are caused
by omitted variables. By contrast, if individual  firm dummies are included, then the explanatory
power of variables de  ining firm level results may be reduced because differences in firms'
capital structures are "explained" by firm specific dummies.
When  industry specific dummies were dropped,  R2 coefficients fell.  However,  the
nmber  of significant coefficients increased.23  By contrast, including firm specific dummis
alters the  results to  a  greater  extent.  Whereas the  R 2 coefficients increase,  some  of  the
explanatory variables lose significance. In a few instances, particularly that of India, Brazil and
Turkey more variables become significant. The significant variables retain their signs.
22  Theoretical  models  by Tian  (1984), Maksimovic  (1988), Maksimovic  and rrm  (1990) and others
predict industry  effects. Empirical evidence  on industry  effects is provided  by Chevalier  (1993) and Phillips (1994)-
23  For example  the GROWTH  coefficientwhich  had been insignificant  become  positive  and significant  in tWo
instances  in the LTDTE equation  (Malaysia  and Turkey) and one instace  in the STDTE equation  (Brazil). The most
interestng case was chat  of (MV-BV)IBV,  which  gains significance  in the STDTE  equation  in two instances  (India  and
Malaysia).  In the LTDTE  equatioD  (MV-BV)/BV  lost significance  in one case aIndia)  and gained  in another  (Zimbabwe).
21Our sample also includes  few,  publicly  controlle enterprises.2  However, excluding
them from the sample  does  not alter the results significantly.
C.  Relative  Exnlanatorv  Power  of Different  Determinants  of Calpital  Structure:
In this section  we analyze  the relative  importance  of different  determinants  of capital  in
explainig  the variation in debt levels for each country in the sample. We compare the
explanatory  power  of  regressions  that include  all the variables  identified  above  as determinants
of financia capital  structur with  regressions  in which  some  variables  are deleted.  The  difference
in explanatory  power  provides  a measure  of the importance  of the deleted  variables  in explainig
sample variation.
Table 7 presents the decomposition  of RI  for short-term  and long-term  debt in each
country in the sample. In accordance  with the discussion  above, the dtrinants  of  capital
structure  are classified  into asset structure,  liqidty,  growth  opportunity,  size effect, tax effect
and industry  effect variables.
Inspection  of Table 7 reveals  that the rankings  of  the avenage  explanatory  power of all
the variables  are very similar  for short-term  and long-term  debt equations  (last three rows), the
only  difference  being in the relatve importance  of industry  effects  and asset structure.  In both
of the debt equations  the industry  effects  and the asset structur composition  have  the greatest
explanatory  power, followed  by liquidity  effects, the size effect, growth opportunities  and
taxes.2 This is consistent  withi  an inspection  of individual  country results, in which asset
24  One  in Korea,threin  TUrkey,nand  onein Mexico.
2X  if Brazil is omitted  from short-term  averages  idustry  effects still have the grtest  explaatory  power.
however  thqUisiy  effect  becomes  moe  imporn th  ran  asset satucture.
22structur and liquidity  variables,  together  with industry  effects  usually  have more explanatory
power tha  growth  opportuiWties,  size effects  and tax effects.
All the variables  with the exception  of the tax and size effects  have on average more
explanatory  power in the short-term  than in the lor.g-tcnno  debt equations.  One interpretation  of
these results is that in our sample  markets  for short-term  financing  may be functioning  better
tha  markets for long term capital.
V.  Concusions
In this paper we have tested agency theoretic and tax-based  explanations  of capital
structure choice on data from a panel of developing  countries. In these countries financial
markets  are underdeveloped  and much  more heavily  regulated  than in the U.S.  The fimns  in the
sample  are much smaler than U.S. fims  on which  financial  structure  models  are usually  tested.
Tax treatment  of debt and equity  also vary considerably  in each country.
Despite these differences,  both the agency  theoretic and tax-based  models of capital
structure  predicted  capital  stuctures in our sample  well. Net fixed assets  are positively  related
to long-term  debt and negatively  related  to long-term  debt. More  profitable  fims and firms  that
are making  large payouts  to shareholders  have  less debt. Firms with high market  to book ratios
have more debt. Finns with high non-debt  tax shields  have  less debt.
interestingly,  total indebtedness  is negatively  related to the ratio of net fixed assets to
total assets. Thus, even fims with assets that could serve as collateral,  finance  themselves  by
retned  earnings  or equity issues  rather  dt  by issuance  of long-term  debt. This suggests  that
23markets  for long-term  credit do not function  effectively  in several  countries  in the sample.
A comparison  of the relative  explanatory  power  of the determinants  of capital  structure
shows that for both short-term  and long-term  equations  in most countries  the asset structure,
liquidity  and industry  effects  have  more  explanatory  power  tha  firm size, growth  opportunities
and tax effects.
The  explanatory  power  of theory  in our sample  is quite  strong  when  compared  to Titman
and Wessels' (1988) study  using US data. This may be in part due to differences  in market
efficiency  and the legal systems.  If alternative  contractal means  of resolving  agency  conflicts
are not avaialable,  then the relationships  derived  from simple  agency-theoretic  models  are more
likely  to have empircal validity.
In this paper we focused  on fim  level differences  in capital structure within each
country. In our fuiture  work we will investigate  cross-country  differences  in capital  structure  in
greater  depth.
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980  9952  998  19aa  1965  199Table  1.  Economic and Financial Development Indicators  - 1991
GDP/CAP is the GDP per capita in US$. M3/GDP is the currency  held outside  the banking  system  plus demand  and intcrest
bearing liabilities  of bznks and nonbank  financial  intermediaries  divided  by GDP.  MCAP is the stack market capitalization
in millions  of US$.  MCAP/GDP is the stock market  capitalization  divided by GDP.  Average annaul inflation is given for
the period 1980-1991.
GDPe  CAP  M3JGDP  MCAP (tie$)  MCAP/GDP  Avemage  Annual
___________  ($)  Inflation  80-91 (%)
United States  18,934  67.0  4,180,210  74.5  4.2
Korea  4,268  52.3  96,373  38.4  5.6
Malaysia  2.449  114.67'  58,627  70.0'  1.7
Brazil  1,893  13.1  42,759  28.3  327.6
Mexico  1,812  25.0  98,178  22.8  66.5
Turkey  1,375  29.4  15,703  16.1  44.7
Jordan  1,372  135.9  2.512  55.3  1.6
Thailand  1,304  71.4  35,815  39.4  3.7
Zimbabwe  653  42.7  1.394  36.0  12.5
India  369  44.2  47,730  17.5  8.2
Pakistan  359  36.5  7.326  19.1  7.0
1988 Figure
27Table 2. Developing Countries  --  Institutional  Factors
Column  (1)  0=published, I =comprehensive  and published  internationally;  Columns  (2) and (3), 0-poor,  I =adequate,  2=good, of internationally  acceptable  quality;  Column
(4), 1  -functioning securities  commission  or similar  government  agency,  0=no agency;  Column  (5), O=free, I =some restrictions,  2=restricted; Column  (6), O=no restrictions,
I -restrictions; Column  (7) 1  =formal  rating agency,  0-no  formal agency.  All data are as of 1992.  Columns  1-5.are  based on the information  provided  in the EmerainE
Markets Factbook  published  by the International  Finance  Company.  Columns  6-7 are from The World's Emerging  Stock Markets, 1993,  by K. Park and A. Van Agtmail,
published  by Porobus, Chicago  and sources In the World Bank.
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  _  (5)  (6)  (7)
Regular  Accounting  Investor  Securities  Restrictions  on:  Restrictions  Formal
Publication  of  Standards  Protection  Commission  on pricing  or  Rating
P/E yield  i  issue of bonds  Agency
Idividend  capital  foreign  or stocks
repat.  repat.  entry
Brazil  1  2  2  I  0  0  0  0  0
Mexico  1  2  2  1  0  0  0  0  I
India  1  2  2  I  1  1  1  I
Korea  1  2  2  1  0  0  1  1  1
Malaysia  1  2  2  1  0  0  0  1  1
Pakistan  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0
Thailand  I  _  I  1  0  0  0  I  0
Jordan_  _  _  _  __  0  0  0  0  0
Turkey  I  I  °  1  0  0  0  1  0
Zimbabwe  0  1  I  2  2  11
Indian  restrictions  were abolished  in May 1992.
28Table 3.  Average Size in Each Quartile  (in US$)
The values are average $ total assets, for each quartile of firms classified by total assets, over the country's sample period.
SALL  AIEDIUM  LARGE  VERY LARGE
US  4,350,000  26,030,000  147,680,000  7,909,830,000
KOREA  630,000  1,210,000  1,780,000  5,270,000
MALAYSIA  198,000  401,000  760,000  3,403,000
INDIA  283,000  572,000  898,000  2,860,000
MEXICO  59,000  180,000  443,000  2,106,000
JORDAN  41,000  96,000  173,000  1,778,000
BRAZIL  99,000  178,000  308,000  939,000
THAILAND  50,000  106,000  200,000  850,000
TURKEY  78,000  176,000  292,000  814,000
PAKISTAN  57,000  118,000  176,000  765,000
ZIMBABWE  59,000  116,000  210,000  644,000
29.u.
Table 4.  Tax Advaniiage of Debt with rcspect to Dividend and  Capital Gains
The fix rates used arc the  slalulory onies. Data are obtained from various editions of Coopers & Lybrand, InlemalionalTax  Summaries.
COUN1fY  KOREA  lUAYSIA  INDIA  . NEXICO  BRA7.L  TIURKEY  PAKISTAN  Z  IM-AUWKr THAnAND
YEAR  1910  1990  1911  1990  1980  1990  1914  1990  19U4  1l9  19e2  1 I990  1980  19185  190  1983  19S2  1990
XI corporate  tax  rate  0420  0.3175  0.500  0.390  0.391  0.52i  0.420  0.360  0.450  0.450  0.400  0.492  0.525  0.400  0.495  0.500  0.300  0.300
X l corporte  tax rate on  distributed  profltS  0.420  0.375  0.500  0.390  0.591  0.55  0.00  0 000  0.450  0.450  0.400  0.492  0.525  1.400  0.495  0.500  0.300  0 300
XI high pcracnal  tax tate  0.744  0.600  0.350  0.400  0.720  0.325  0.530  04.0  0.600  0.300  0.630  0.500  0.660  0.450  0.495  0.600  0.630  01i50
X,  pOfaufal  capitIz  gains  u;  0.744  .000  0.000  0.000  0.720  0.52S  0.510  0 450  0.600  0.250  0.650  0.500  0.000  0.0W  0.000  0.300  0.000  0.000
Xs  mate  on interst  income  0.744  0.600  0.550  0.400  0.720  0.525  0.550  0.450  0.600  0.500  0.650  0.50a  0.660  0.450  0.495  0.600  0.650  0.550
X4  rate an dividend  Income  0.744  0.600  0.400  0.350  0.720  0.525  0.oo  0.000  0.230  0.010  0.850  0.S00  0.660  0.450  0.200  0.200  0.650  0.5S0
XI tax tel  ate en dIvidendr  0O.50  0.120  0.40D  0.550  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.  000  0.000  0.00  0.330  0 330  0.000  0.000  0.000  0000  0.350  0.  300
X. net intetcll income per  Sl  0.255  0.400  0.450  0.600  0.230  0.475  0.410  0.5510  .400  0.500  0.350  0.500  0.340  0.550  0.505  0.400  0.350  0.*50
X, net capital  salns  per SI  0.141  0.250  0.500  0.610  0.114  0.226  0.261  0*352  0.230  0.413  0.210  0.254  0.475  0.600  0.505  0.350O  0.70W  0.70
X,  el dividendspef  SI  0.235  01S  0.500  0.610  0.114  0.226  1.00a  I W  0.414  0.506  0.405  0.421  0.162  0.330  0.404  0.400  0.490  0.525
XI1 taediaa2vanialeofdividenoJaw.  r.t. Jeh  0.0S0  0111  *0.111  *0.017  0.591  0.515  -1.222  .0.116  0.D59  *0.012  *0.166  0.157  0.525  0.400  0.200  0.000  .0.400  -0.167
X3 1laxdindvantageadcspitalgainsw.r.tdclbt  0.420  0.375  .0.111  *0.017  |0591  0.52$  0.420  0.360  0.450  0.17S  0.400  0.492  .0.397  40.091  0.0o  0.125  -1.000  4.5*6
XII  - I  - X,. X  - (I  *-X,  (I(4).  X's  - (-  X  XJ) (I.X  + XI). XC  - (X, - X5)/XI krid  XI, - (XI - XJYX.
30able S.  Capital S4ructure  - Descriplive Satistics by Country
LTD\TE ii hb  book  value  of lonSg  ter  debt  divided  by  book  valu  of  equity. STDITE  and  TDITE&  re the  book  value  of short  itan  and  otal  debt  divided  by book  value  or  equity. NFATA is the  nct  fixed  aaseu  divided  by
lotl  ssets.  DIVCSH  Is the  dividends  divided  by eamings  afer Laxes  plus  deprecialion.  DIVTA Is the  dividerds  divided  by total ssets.  GROWTH  Is the  growth  te oo  teal  total assets.  PROFIT  is the  incone  beforc  interest
end  taxcs  divided  by lotal  ssets.  (MV*RV)IBV  is the market  vAlue  of equity  minus  book  value  of equity  divided  by  book  value  of equity. NSNFA  Is the  net  sales  divided  by net fixed  *as.t  NDTS  is the  nond  :bt tas  shield
which  Is earnings  before  Uxes  minus  thc  tatlo  of corporate  taxes  paid  to  corporate  taic rate,  dclated  by otalI  assets.  TA/GDP  Is total  Assets  divided  by  the  GDP  of the  eountry.  Te  value  of each  item  is calculated  as  dtt
average  of all lirms  for tach country's  sample  period. Extended  variable  definitions  and  sources  are  given  in the  Appendix.
LTDITE  uTrnrr  TDrTE  NFATA  DEPTA  DIVCSII  DIVTA  GROWFH  PRtOFIT  MtV-DY  NSNFA  NDTS  TAIGDP
ERAZII.  .139  .421  .560  .640  .002  .170  .057  - 1.164  517  -
friA  .745  1i350  259S  .411  .039  .193  .01e  .109  .132  .135  5.691  023  .0006
JORDAN  .274  MM  1.180  .469  . .032  .077  .065  .439  2 760  oOS7
KOREA  1.05E  2.391  3.449  .371  .053  .122  OD18  .104  .100  -.21S  4 336  002  .0023
MALAYSIA  .278  .833  1.111  .465  .023  .350  .024  .170  .035  1.24?  3.025  003  .004t
MEXICO  .401  .417  .818  .569  .034  .079  - 1.463  .013  -
PAKISTAN  .596  2.359  2.955  .334  .03E  .232  102  .010  .115  11.144  055  .0011
lURKEY  .4S5  1.509  1.994  .415  - 068  .080  .238  4 231  010  .0010
ZINIMADWE  .187  .615  .802  .031  .260  .028  .034  .131  -.437  033  0062
THIAIILAND  =  2.332  .398  =  .041  .223  2.021  5.310  0007
31Table  6.a.  Capital  Structure  In Developing  Countries  -LTD/TE
Estimated  model  is: LTDITR - e + p, SZ +  I,  IN + aJT  + 0, NPATA + Os  DEPTA  + 5. DIVCSH  (or  DIVTA) + 5, GROWTH  + 0, PROFrT  + 0, (MV-BVIBV)  + P, NSNFA +  0,  NDTS  e.  te
dependent  vaiiable  Is long  term  debt  to cquit  ratlo. Definitions  of Independent  variables  are  given  ins  ihe  appendix.  Regression  is estimated  usinB  Ordinary  Least  Squars. Not repaited  below  are  secgor(IN)  ad
year  (T) dummy  variablcs.  White's  heseroakedasticity-corrmced  standard  errors  are  giYCn  in parenthesls.  and  * indicate  dial ihe  coetficilent  i  signinleanly  different  frm  seto  at I and  5 pereent  levels  respectely.
KOREA  MALAYSIA  INDIA  MEXICO  JORDAN  BRAZIL  TURKEY  PAKISTAN  Z[MBABRWE
NFATA  1,498"  -.310  1.704"  6.146"  .617"  -.112  .297  1.992"
(.409)  (.176)  (.233)  (2.247)  ( 195)  (.060)  (.402)  (.462)
DEFrA  -7.382"  -.916  -1.301  -2.023  -.068
(1.192)  (1.526)  (1.097)  (1.327)  (.787)
DIVCSH  -.735  .033  -1.355"  -.547"  -.27t"
(.528)  (.027)  (.564)  (.154)  (.086)
DIVTA  .389  -.607  -1.175
_____________  (.872)  (.696)  (,782)
GROWfTH  -.881"  .137  -.054  -.002  .051  -.008  .296  .667"  -.050
(.247)  (.088)  (.125)  (.003)  (.109)  (.005)  (.184)  (.264)  (.075)
PROFIT  -5.607"  -2.5  15"  -.435  -3.389"  -.181  -.445"  -1.176"  .464  -.466
(1.386)  (.532)  (.345)  (1.158)  (.329)  (.1 18)  (.276)  (.554)  (.473)
MV IY  .832'  .025  .026'  -.029  .173
BV  (.421)  (.014)  (.012)  (.052)  (.124)
NSNFA  .002  -.011I'  .002  .545"  -.006  -.002  -.028-  -.002
(.010)  (.003)  (.002)  (.209)  (.009)  (.008)  (.012)  (.002)
NDTS  -4.263"  .402  -I.11I  3.420  -.268  .142  -2.427"  .136
(1.807)  (.250)  (.841)  (1.583)  (.216)  (.294)  (.646)  (.586)
SZ2  -.163'  -.058  -.203"  .163  -.088  -.023  -.117  .171  -.121"
(.082)  (.044)  (.064)  (.173)  (.082)  (.019)  (.081)  (.157)  (.043)
SZ3  -.020  .187"  -. 046  - .050  .039  -.003  -.138  -.205  -.083"
____________  (.070)  (.057)  (.073)  (.289)  (.079)  (.022)  (.081)  (.107)  (.041)
SZ4  .688"  .181"  -.089  .907'  .241  .095  -.064  -.126  .033
(.141)  (.065)  (.066)  (.434)  (.062)  (.026)  (.108)  (.137)  (.059)
Rs|  .26  .20  .30  .30  .35  .24  .23  .28  .21
adj R'  .23  .15  .27  .21  .28  .22  .14  .25  .17
N  982  630  743  277  320  598  . 325  809  321
32Table  6.b. Capital  Structure in Developing  Countries  - STD/TE
Esirmatcd  mulel is: STDITE  - a + p SZ + B,  IN + B,T + Bd  Nr'ATA + B,  DEPrA + 0, DIVCSII  (or DIVTA) 4  p,  GROWT}I  + p, PROFIT  + p, (MV.DVJBV)  +  0,, NSfFA + pi, ND7S + *  Te dependent  varlabic It shon crmn  dcbt  (o equicy  ratio.  Derinilions  of Independent  varablcs ate given  in  te. appetdix. Regression  Is estinuted using Ordinaiy Leust  Squares.  "ot reported  btelow  ar setor  N) ad year (T) dummy  variablts. White's heecroskedasticity-correcled  standard  errors are given In  parenthesis.  and * Indicate  thal  the  coerrcient is significnly  ditferenA  from zero at I arid  peret  leves respectively.
. - - -
KOREA  MIALAYSIA  INDIA  MEXICO  JORDAN  BRAZIL  TURKEY  PAKISTAN  ZIMBABWE
NFATA  -1.733"  -.732"  -1.339"  .819  -1.606"  -1.096"  -2.652"  -2.833"
(.567)  (. I 10)  (.385)  (.527)  (.418)  (.140)  (.505)  (.820)
DEPTA  .4.914"  8.532"  -7.576"  -3.086  -1.9S54
(2.001)  (2.509)  (1.820)  (2.715)  (.547)
DIVCSII  -1.056  -.031  -1.914"  -1.928-  -.164- L____  _  (.808)  (.043)  (.919)  _  (.553)  (.078)
DIVTA  -1.324  1.711  -2.917"
. __________  ____________  _____  _  ___________  _(1,956)  (2.477)  (1.088) 
GROWThI  .289  -.002  -.149  -.001  .223  .009  .629"  1.341"  .104
(.370)  (.047)  (.238)  (.001)  (.181)  (.010)  (.155)  (.514)  (.079)
PROFIT  -4.090"  -2.670"  -4.493"  -2,098"  -3.135"  -.519  -3.240"  -3.923"  -.940
(Z.021)  (.625)  (.706)  (.420)  (1.124)  (.285)  (.623)  (.931)  (.380)
MV-BV  .542"  .076  .052  .305"'  .404"
BV  (.214)  (.074)  (.035)  (.146)  0  _  (.3)
NSNFA  .003  -.003  .035"  .11S'  .023  .051"  .007  .018'
(.009)  (.002)  (.010)  (.061)  (.026)  (.019)  (.024)  (.004)
NDTS  -9.184'  -.918'  .2.270  .541  -.972"  -.821  -5.678"  -.501
(4.458)  (.433)  (1.780)  (.509)  (.420)  (.441)  (1.908)  (.378)
SZ2  -.089  -.140"  -.510"  -.  10d  .109  -.023  .111  1.024'  .033
(.139)  (.065)  (.127)  (.091)  (.225)  (.038)  (.189)  (.584)  (.050)
SZ3  -.176  237'  -.175  -.347"  -.115  -.008  -.027  -.491  -.166"
.____  _  (. 160U)  (.097)  (.114)  (.128)  (.204)  (.040)  (.135)  (.432)  (.046)
SZ4  .465"  .097  -.440"  -.079  .338  .132"  .665"  -.381  -.177"
_ _  (.166)  (.081)  (.111)  (.122)  (.194)  (.056)  (.216)  (.418)  (.054)
R__  ._  '31  .29  .37  .28  .46  .43  .43  .19  .24
adJ R'  .29  .25  .34  .19  .40  .42  .37  .14  .20
N  981  630  743  277  320  s  598  325  809  321
33Table  6.c.  Capital Structure  in Developing Countries -TDITE
Eslimaled  model  is: TDITB = a + fit SZ + f13  IN + 13T  + 13  NPATA  + 1j DEPTA  + p, DIVCSH  (or DIVTA)  + PI GROWTH  +  a, PROFIT  +  P, (MV.BV/B"j +  ga.  NSNFA  + p1,  NDTS  + e.  The
dependeni  variable  is total debt to equity ratio. Delinitions  of independent  variables  are  given  In  the  appendix.  Regressilon  is estimated  using  Ordinary  Least  Squarr..  Not  mrponed  below  are  sector  (IN) and  year  (T) dummy  variables.  White's  heirmskedasticity-corrected  slandard  errors  ard  given  in parenihesis.*  and  ' indicate  that  the coerficient  is signricantly  different  from  zer at I and  5 percent  levels  respectively. - - _  . ________________
|_______  KOREA  MALAYSIA  INDIA  MEXICO  JORDAN  BRAZIL  TURKEY  PAKISTAN  ZINMBARWE  1THAILAND
NFATA  -.555  -1.042"  .365  6.965"  - .998'  -1.20B"  -2.355"  -.856  -.247
5.7S9)  (.206)  (.543)  (2.611)  (.478)  (.159)  (.669)  (1.074)  (.894)
DEPrA  -10.S05"  7.616"  -8.878"  -5.119  -2.022"
(2.781)  (2.779)  (2.635)  (3.722)  (1.023)
DIVCSH  -1.845  .002  -3.270".  -2.475"  -.435'
(1.347)  (.054)  (1.431)  (.674)  (.146)
DIVTA  -.935  1.105  -4.092'  -8.678"
_____________  (2.177)  (2.24B)  (1.531)  _  _  (3.411)
GROWFH  -.541  .135  -.204  - .003  .273  -.001  .925"  2.009"  .053  -.699"
(.483)  (.093)  (.331)  (.004)  (.240)  (.013)  (.291)  (.671)  (.127)  (.261)
PROFIT  -10.252"  -5.185"  -4.928"  -5.4864'  -3.316'  -.974"  -4.417"  -3.461"  -1.406
(2.758)  (.863)  (.974)  (1.379)  (1.185)  (.311)  (.729)  (1.114)  (.752)
MV-BV  1.341-  .101  .078  .276  .577"  .153
DV  (.619)  (.074)  (.045)  (.170)  (.221)  (.089)
NSNFA  .008  -.014"  .037"  .663"  -.028  .049"  -.022  -.017"*  .008
___________  (.015)  (.004)  (.012)  (.241)  (.032)  (.022)  (.029)  (.005)  (.026)
NDTS  -14.278"'  -.516  -3.384  3.961'  -1.240"  -.680  -8.107"  -.364
(5.973)  (.512)  (2.481)  (1.828)  (.545)  (.493)  (1.489)  (.787)
SZ2  .095  .083  -.713"  .063  .021  -.047  -.006  1.201  -.087  -.048
(.194)  (.083)  (.174)  (.221)  (.248)  (.047)  (.224)  (.686)  (.082)  (.343)
SZ3  -.237  .425"  -.220  -.397  -.076  .005  -.165  -.690  -.!49"  .508
(.191)  (.116)  (.166)  (.363)  (.239)  (.052)  (.168)  (.468)  (.079)  (.429)
SZ4  1.136"  .278"  -.529"  .828  .580"  .228"  -.601i  -.501  -.143  .965s
|__________  (.253)  (.107)  (.159)  (.514)  (.220)  (.068)  (.272)  (.488)  (.102)  (.308)
R'  _.33  .32  .25  .29  .42  .42  .38  .18  .21  .19
adj R2 .31  .29  .22  .20  .35  .40  .32  .15  .17  .12
N  981  630  743  277  320  598  325  809  321  371
34lable  . Delenninanis of Capital Structure  - Relative Explanatory  Power
Reported  numbers  are Oie adjusted  R's after  deleting  the specified  variables. The  difference  between  the adjusled  RI of the fill  model  and ihat  of the deleted  models  are  given in parmnhesis  and ate  avenged  bi do  .
last rows. Variable  definitions  and  sources  arc given  in the Appendix.
Full  Asset Structure  Liquidity  Growth  Size Effect  Tax Effect  Industry Effect
Omits  NFATA,  Omits  Opportunities  Omits  Size  Omits  NDTS  Omits  Industry
NSNFA  DIVCSHIDIVTA  Omits  Growth  Dummies  DEPTA  Dummies
_________  _______  ____________  Profit  (MV-BV)/BV  . _
KOREA  LTD  .23  .22  (.01)  .20  (.03)  .16  (.07)  .20  (.03)  .21  (.02)  .20  (.03)
ST)  _.29  .28  (.01)  .28  (.01)  .28  (.01)  .28  (.01)  .27  (.02)  .19  (.10)
MALAYSIA  LTD  .15  .13  (.02)  .11  (.04)  .13  (.02)  .13  (.02)  .15  (0)  .13  (.02)
STD  .25  .23  (.02)  .23  (.02)  .24  (.01)  .25  (0)  .24  (.01)  .17  (.08)
INDIA  LTD  .27  .20  (.07)  .23  (.04)  .26  (.01)  .26  (.01)  .26  (.01)  .25  (.02)
STD  .34  .27  (.07)  .25  (.09)  .34  (0)  33  (.01)  .33  (.01)  .33  (.01)
PAKISTAN  LTD  .25  .20  (.05)  .24  (.01)  .24  (.01)  .24  (.01)  .23  (.02)  .18  (.07)
STD  .14  .12  (.02)  .12  (.02)  .14  (0)  .13  (.01)  .13  (.01)  .11  (.03)
TURKEY  LTD  .14  .13  (.01)  .11  (.03)  .13  (.01)  .15  (-.01)  .15  (-.01)  .10  (.04)
STD  .37  .26  (.11)  .24  (.13)  .35  (.02)  .33  (.04)  .36  (.01)  .33  (.04)
JORDAN  LTD  .28  .25  (.03)  .28  (0)  .28  (0)  .25  (.03)  - .21  (.07)
STD  :40  .36  (.04)  .32  (.08)  .37  (.03)  .38  (.02)  - .30  (.10)
MEXICO  LTD  .21  .11  (.10)  .20  (.01)  .21  ( 0 )  .19  (.02)  .20  (.01)  .16  (.05)
STD  .19  .18  (.01)  .14  (.05)  .19  (0)  .16  (.03)  .19  (0 )  .16  (.03)
BRAZII,  LTD  .22  .21  (.01)  .21  (.01)  .22  (0)  .18  (.04)  .22  (0)  -
STD  .42  .16  (.26)  .42  (0)  .42  (0)  .41  (.01)  .41  (.01)
ZIMBABWE  LTD  .17  - .10  (.07)  .14  (.03)  .12  (.05)  .18  (.01)
STD  .20  - .17  (.03)  .08  (.12)  .13  (.07)  .18  (.02)  -
THAILAND  TD  .12  .12  (0)  .09  (.03)  .09  (.03)  .11  (.01)  - .10  (.02)
Average  LTD  (.038)  (.027)  (.017)  (.022)  (.008)  (.043)
STD  (.068)  (.048)  (.021)  (.022)  (.001)  (.056)
All . (.049)  (.037)  (.020)  (.022)  (.009)  (.047)
35Appendix: Variablc Definitions and Sourccs
Variables:
LTD/TE
Le ng tenn debt to total equity
STD/TE,
Short term debt to total equity
TD/TE
Total debt to total equity
NFATA =  NFA/TA
Net fixed assets divided by total assets
DEPTA =  DEP/TA
Depreciation divided by total assets
DIVCSH =  DIV/(EAT+DEP)
Dividends divided by earniings  after taxes plus depreciation
DIVTA =  DIV/TA
Dividends divided by total assets
GROWTH =  ((TA/GDPDEF)-LAG(TA/GDPDEF))/LAG(TAIGDPDEF)
Growth rate of real total assets
PROFIT =  BIT/TA
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. If EBIT is Pot available
EBT is used instead
(MV-BV)/BBV
Market value of equity minus book value of equity, divided by book value
NSNFA =  NS/NFA
Net sales divided by net fixed assets
36-NDTS =  (01 - FE - (EBT-EAf)/CTR)/TA  =  (EBT - TAX/CTR)/TA
Non-debt tax shields equals  earnings before taxes (operating  income minus  financial  expenses)
minus the ratio of corporate  taxes paid to corporate  tax rate, all deflated  by total assets
SZ1-SZ4
Size quartile dummies.  SZ1 takes the value 1 if the company  is in the first asset quartile in the
country and zero if it is not.
TAGDP = TA1GDP
Total asset size of the company  relative  to GDP of the country
SIC1-SIC61
Sector dummy  variables  for different  SIC codes
AGE =  YEAR - ESTYEAR
Year minus year established.
YOUNG
Dummy variable that takes the value I if AGE is less than or equal to 5 and zero otherwise.
Sources:
Firm level variables  are constncted from IFC's Corporate  Finance  data set (see Table Al  for a summary).
Tax data are from Coopers & Lybrand, International  Tax Summaries,  John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., various
issues.
37Table  Al.  IrC's Corporate  Finance  Data Base
|COUNTRY  BRAZIL  INDIA  IORDAN  KUREA  .MALAYSIA  MEXICO  PAKISTAN. THAILAND  TURKEY  ZIMBADI%W
IndusIrv  X  X*  x  X  x  X  X  X
Listed  Date  . . X  . X  X  X  X  _  X
Eslabllir,htd  Dalo  X  __.  x  _  x  x  x  x  ..
Curren!  Assets  *..  X  X  X  X  X  O  X  ___X__  -
Nei Fixed  Assets  X  X  _X  _  _  2  __X  _  X  XXX
Total Assets  _  x  X  X  x  X  _  x  _  XX  _  ._XXX
Current  liabilities  .-  X  . x  X  X  _X  XX  .. XX
Lone  TeFmn  LiabTilites  X  X  . X  X  X  X  _XX  _  X
(LTD)
Total Liabilities  X  X.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
Paid  in Canital  X  X  .X  X  X  X  X  X  _i
Raserves  & Retained  _  _  X  X  . X  X  X  __  X  X
_a _  ines  ____I
Revaluation  Fund  - _  . X
Total  Fouilv  X  X  X  _  X  X  X ._  X  _XX  . X
Sales  _  x  x  X  X  x  x  X  X  X
Fi'nancial  Expenses  - ........  L..  K.  .. L...  .. Q......  .. x.
F  BT  I  X  x  X  X  %  X  X  XX
EAT  X  X  X  -X  X  X  X  _  XXX
Denreciation  _  _  ..  . - _LX
Dividends  X  - X  X  X
Price  X  K  X  X  _  XO  X  X  X
Number  of Shares  X  X  - X  X  XX  X  %
Market  Value  X  *  x  . 0  X  _  X
5  Years  _  _  80^90  80-90  80"9d  83 9a0Sam84-41  _  0-  &8  83  82-90  08 
Number  of Firms  100  ,J1  88  _38  100  100  . 100  100  69  45  48
O represents  fewer  data  points.
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